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THE FATE OF GRADUATION PRAYERS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
AFTER LEE V. WEISMAN
The use of invocations and benedictions in public ceremonies, includ-
ing school commencement exercises, is a long-standing tradition in our
Nation.1 The permissibility of prayer at public school graduation cere-
monies is an issue touching many school districts across the country.2 In
Lee v. Weisman,' the United States Supreme Court held that a member
of the clergy may not deliver nondenominational prayers at public high
school graduation ceremonies without violating the First Amendment.'
Lee v. Weisman continues the national debate about the proper role of
religious prayers in public schools that began with the first school prayer
cases.' Weisman answers the narrow question whether a member of the
clergy may deliver a nondenominational prayer at a public school gradu-
ation ceremony but leaves open the question whether other nondenomi-
national types of prayer are proscribed at all public school ceremonies.6
Moreover, Weisman departs from the settled framework which has
guided Establishment Clause analysis for more than twenty years and
1. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2678-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting). "In holding that the
Establishment Clause prohibits invocations and benedictions at public school graduation ceremo-
nies, the Court... lays waste a tradition that is a component of an even more longstanding Ameri-
can tradition of nonsectarian prayer to God at public celebrations generally." Id. See also infra
note 137.
The National School Boards Association ("NSBA") conducted a survey of the largest public
school districts across the country to determine the pervasiveness of invocations and benedictions at
graduation ceremonies. Within the 21 school districts surveyed, having a total student enrollment of
2,652,571, 14 of the districts, representing 1,472,103 pupils, permitted some form of graduation
prayer. Brief for National School Boards Association in support of Petitioner at *7, Lee v. Weis-
man, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (No. 90-1014) (LEXIS, Genfed library, S. Ct. file).
2. Brief for Utah, Idaho, North Dakota, Pennsylvania and Wyoming in support of Petitioner
at *5-7, Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (No. 90-1014) (LEXIS, Genfed library, S. Ct. file).
3. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
4. The First Amendment bars Congress from making laws "respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. Over the past decade many constitutional amendments authorizing prayer in schools have
been proposed. In 1980, Senator Helms' efforts centered around legislation curbing the Court's
jurisdiction. In May 1982, former President Reagan proposed a constitutional amendment provid-
ing that "nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to prohibit individual or group prayer in
public schools or other public institutions." Despite intensive lobbying efforts supporting the propo-
sition, the proffered amendments failed. Mary Ellen Quinn Johnson, Comment, School Prayer and
the Constitution: Silence is Golden, 48 MD. L. REV. 1018, 1019 nn.4 & 5 (1989).
6. See infra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
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creates uncertainty as to the proper legal standards applicable in church-
state jurisprudence.
Part II of this Recent Development discusses the evolution of the pri-
mary principles governing Establishment Clause cases generally, paying
special attention to the elementary and secondary public school setting.
Part III then examines the Court's departure from well-settled Religion
Clause analysis in Lee v. Weisman and the Court's formulation of a new
test to govern this area of law. Finally, Part IV explores some of the
possible effects of the new principles on the future of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Founding Fathers of our Constitution did not foresee that confu-
sion and disagreement would eventually plague the relationship between
religion and government.7 The authors of the eighty-five essays compris-
ing the Federalist Papers8 briefly spoke to the church/state issue with
two short sentences.9 To end any lingering doubts that the Constitution
did not adequately protect religious freedoms, the drafters of the Bill of
Rights added the First Amendment to prohibit Congress from legislating
with respect to the establishment or exercise of religion.'"
The First Amendment contains two clauses addressing religion."
These Religion Clauses demand that Congress make no law with respect
to the "establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."' 2 The first clause is referred to as the Establishment Clause; the
second is the Free Exercise Clause. An inherent tension exists between
7. Gregg Ivers, Redefining the First Freedom: The Supreme Court and the Consolidation of
State Power, New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publications (forthcoming 1992).
8. A total of 85 essays, 51 authored by Alexander Hamilton, 29 by James Madison, and 5 by
John Jay, on the proposed new federal constitution were put together in a book called The
Federalist.
9. Gregg Ivers, Organized Religion and the Supreme Court, 32 J. Church & ST. 775 (1990).
"In The Federalist, Publius mentioned only that 'in a free government, the security... for religious
rights consists in the multiplicity of sects,' and that 'the degree of security will depend on the number
of ... sects' allowed to flourish." Id. at 775.
10. Id. at 775-76.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Constitution also mentions the subject of religion in Article VI,
clause 3 which provides that: "no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any
Office or public Trust under the United States." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.3.
12. Both of the Religion Clauses apply to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Establishment Clause was first held applicable to the states in Everson
v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947); the Free Exercise Clause was
held applicable to the states in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
[Vol. 71:957
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the two clauses because one prohibits the government from establishing
religion and the other commands the government not to inhibit its prac-
tice.1 3 This Recent Development deals primarily with the Establishment
Clause14 which, under the holding of Lee v. Weisman, speaks directly to
whether government may support prayer at public school graduations.15
II. THE PRIMARY PRINCIPLES GOVERNING RELIGIOUS
ESTABLISHMENT
The development of rules governing the variety of problems that arise
under the Establishment Clause has been far from fluid. To compound
this dilemma, the proper separation of church-state relations has been an
intensely divisive issue for the Justices on the current Court.16 A major-
ity of the Justices have openly expressed immense dissatisfaction with the
test that the Court enunciated in 1971 in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 17 None-
theless, Lemon has provided the most settled framework for determining
when government involvement with religious practices collides with the
Constitution. 18
Rather than using Lee v. Weisman as an opportunity to reconsider this
13. See generally, LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-3, at 1158-
66 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the conflict between the directives of the two clauses); see Jesse H.
Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PIT. L. REV.
673 (1980).
14. This Recent Development does not focus upon the Free Exercise Clause. For a discussion
of the Free Exercise Clause, see M. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1410 (1990); see also, Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The
Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REv. 933 (1989).
15. The focus of this Recent Development, however, should not obscure the fact that the two
religion clauses are interrelated. The provisions protect overlapping values, both promoting the goal
of protecting an individual's freedom of religious belief. See Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in
First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 817 (1984).
16. Ruth Marcus, High Court Bans Graduation Prayer At Public Schools, WASH. POST, June
25, 1992, at Al.
17. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See eg., County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492
U.S. 573, 656 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("Sub-
stantial revision of our Establishment Clause doctrine may be in order...."); Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[A] pessimistic evaluation... of Lemon is particu-
larly applicable to the 'purpose' prong .... ); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) ("[The Lemon test is] a constitutional theory [that] has no basis in the history of the
amendment it seeks to interpret, is difficult to apply, and yields unprincipled results .... ); Aguilar
v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 429 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (raising substantial "doubts about
[Lemon's third prong] the entanglement test"); Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U.S.
736, 768 (1976) (White, J., concurring) ("I am no more reconciled now to Lemon than I was when it
was decided.").
18. See infra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
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existing law, the Court expressly declined the invitation to do so. 9 How-
ever, the Court, while purporting to apply Lemon, in fact ignored the
Lemon framework entirely-paying lip service to the case in only one
brief instance in the majority opinion.2° Instead of relying on Lemon,
the Court focused on the coercive nature of the school prayer in question
creating a new coercion test to govern Establishment Clause analysis. 21
Thus, the viability of Lemon and its progeny, under current First
Amendment jurisprudence, is imperiled.22
A. Evolution of the Lemon Test
The history and tradition of religious activity in our Nation has influ-
enced Establishment Clause analysis.23 As the three-pronged Lemon test
evolved through caselaw, the Court made certain to incorporate the fun-
damental role of history and tradition in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.
The Court planted first seed of the Lemon analysis and the role of
history and tradition in Establishment Clause law in Engel v. Vitale 24 In
Engel, the New York Board of Regents drafted and recommended that
school districts have classes recite aloud a nondenominational prayer
mentioning God.25 Relying heavily on history and tradition,26 the Court
19. 112 S. Ct. at 2655.
This case does not require us to revisit the difficult ... questions of the definition and full
scope of the principles governing the extent of permitted accommodation by the State for
the religious beliefs and practices of many of its citizens. [Tihe controlling precedents as
they relate to prayer and religious exercise in primary and secondary public schools compel
the holding here. ... Thus, we do not accept the invitation to reconsider our decision in
Lemon v. Kurtzman.
Id.
20. The majority opinion cited Lemon once. Id. Only the concurring Justices expressly relied
upon the Lemon formula. Id. at 2663-64 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun set forth
the three prongs of the Lemon test and emphasized that the application of these principles to the
instant case mandated the decision reached by the Court. Id. Blackmun would have found the
challenged invocation and benediction in Weisman an unconstitutional violation of Lemon's second
prong-advancing or promoting religion. Id. at 2664.
21. See infra notes 99-127 and accompanying text.
22. Since Lemon in 1971, the Supreme Court has decided 31 Establishment Clause cases. With
only a single exception, the decision in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), the Court has
continued vigorously to apply the Lemon tripartite framework. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S.Ct. 2649,
2663 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
23. See, eg., Lynch v. Donnelley, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783
(1983); Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
24. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
25. The prayer consisted of "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and
beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country." Id. at 422.
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held that recitation of a state-composed prayer in public school class-
rooms was unconstitutional.27 In his concurrence, Justice Douglas em-
phasized the coercive nature of prayer in the elementary and secondary
public school setting in light of the fact that school attendance was
mandatory.2" Thus Engel highlighted that vocal prayers inside the pub-
lic school classroom were unconstitutionally coercive because classroom
attendance was not voluntary.2 9 However, Engel left open the question
whether prayers were permissible at voluntary, extracurricular public
school events such as graduation ceremonies.30
One year after Engel, the Court extended the guiding principles sup-
porting its holding beyond the area of state-composed prayers while
making its first attempt to formulate a standard for judging Establish-
ment Clause cases. In Abington School District v. Schempp,31 members of
the Unitary Church challenged a state law requiring that ten verses from
the Bible be read aloud at the opening of each public school day.32 Jus-
tice Clark, writing for the majority, found the law unconstitutional in
that it violated a "purpose" and "effect" test which would later form the
basis for the first and second prongs, respectively, of the Lemon test.33
Subsequently, in Walz v. Tax Commission34 the Court expanded the
26. Id. at 425-435. Justice Black, writing for the Court, noted that objections to "this very
practice of establishing governmentally composed prayers" prompted many of the colonists to leave
England. He added, quoting James Madison, that the prayer's purported nondenominational char-
acter did not save it because "the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all
other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all
other Sects." Id. at 436.
27. The Court stated that "in this country it is no part of the business of government to com-
pose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program
carried on by government." Id. at 425.
28. Id. at 441. The Court believed that compulsory attendance policies brought the students
within the realm of the state's coercive powers.
29. However, the Engel Court did not require coercion for an Establishment Clause violation.
See infra note 101.
30. See infra notes 99-112 and accompanying text for the Weisman Court's discussion of the
role of "voluntariness" versus "coercion" in determining whether a challenged practice is constitu-
tionally permissible.
31. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
32. The Pennsylvania law provided: "At least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read,
without comment, at the opening of each public school on each school day. Any child shall be
excused from such Bible reading, or attending such Bible reading, upon written request of his parent
or guardian." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 15-1516 (1960).
33. The Court stated that, to survive an Establishment Clause challenge, an activity must have
"a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222.
34. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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two-pronged test articulated by Justice Clark in Schempp.35 In Walz,
the Court upheld property tax exemptions for religious organizations as
part of a broad scheme for exempting a variety of nonprofit institutions.
Walz added a new ingredient to the Establishment Clause test, stating
that the challenged program must not foster "excessive government en-
tanglement with religion."36 The "entanglement" test later appeared as
the third prong of the Lemon test."7 As with previous Establishment
Clause cases, the Walz Court was clearly influenced by history; the his-
torical tradition of over 200 years of granting exemptions similar to those
at issue.38
The Court continued to develop the three prongs emerging from
Schempp and Walz. Although Lemon formulated the three inquiries as
a single test, the relationship between the prongs remained unclear. In
Stone v. Graham,39 the Supreme Court established that failure to satisfy
any one prong of the Lemon test would create a constitutional viola-
tion." Despite recurring criticism of the Lemon standard as applied in
35. See supra note 33.
36. Walz, 397 U.S. at 664-80. To be valid, the tax exempt program must: (1) have a secular
purpose; (2) not have a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion; and (3) avoid causing an
excessive entanglement between government and religion. Id. The Court found that the tax scheme
had a secular purpose and only incidentally aided religion. Id. at 676-77.
37. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614-15. The "entanglement" test has been the target of substantial
criticism from numerous legal commentators. See Kenneth F. Ripple, The Entanglement Test of the
Religion Clauses: A Ten Year Assessment, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1195 (1980), and Schotten, The
Establishment Clause and Excessive Governmental-Religious Entanglement: The Constitutional Sta-
tus of Aid to Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Schools, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 207 (1979).
38. Walz, 397 U.S. at 675-80.
39. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
40. In Stone, the Court held unconstitutional a Kentucky statute requiring that a copy of the
Ten Commandments be posted on the walls of each public classroom. The Kentucky statute pro-
vided in pertinent part:
It shall be the duty of the superintendent of public instruction, provided sufficient funds are
available as provided in subsection (3) of this Section, to ensure that a durable, permanent
copy of the Ten Commandments shall be displayed on a wall in each public elementary and
secondary school classroom in the Commonwealth.
449 U.S. at 39.
The Court relied on the Lemon test, finding that the Kentucky requirement had "no secular
legislative purpose." Id. at 41. The Court determined that the Ten Commandments were:
[U]ndeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths... [and] [i]f the posted copies
... are to have any effect at all, it will be to induce the school children to read, meditate
upon, perhaps to venerate and obey, the Commandments. However desirable this might be
as a matter of private devotion, it is not a permissible state objective under the Establish-
ment Clause.
449 U.S. at 41-42.
The asserted secular purpose of the statute was written on each display of the Ten Command-
ments and provided: "The secular application of the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in its adop-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss3/14
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Stone,41 it is the only test upon which a majority of the Court has
reached a consensus.42
After Stone articulated the proper application of the Lemon test, the
Court turned to whether moment-of-silence statutes survived Lemon
scrutiny. Wallace v. Jaffree4 3 held unconstitutional Alabama's moment-
of-silence statute" which authorized schools to set aside one minute at
the start of the school day "for meditation or voluntary prayer. ' 45 The
background surrounding the legislative scheme demonstrated that it
"had no secular purpose."" In response to a growing dissatisfaction
with the Lemon test among some members of the Court,4 7 Justice
O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, developed an alternative frame-
work. O'Connor reformulated the first "purpose" and "effect" prongs of
the Lemon inquiry into a single "endorsement" test which asks whether
the challenged practice has the effect of endorsing or disapproving of reli-
gious beliefs.4 8 Although the Court's recent trend signaled a desire to
tion as the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the Common Law of the United
States." Id. at 41. Justice Rehnquist's dissent insisted that "the fact that the asserted secular pur-
pose may overlap with what some may see as a religious objective does not render [the law] unconsti-
tutional." Id. at 44.
Stone enunciated that a statute violating any one of the prongs of the Lemon framework will be
found unconstitutional without consideration of the remaining two prongs of the analysis. "If a
statute violates any of [the] three [Lemon] principles, it must be struck down under the Establish-
ment Clause. We conclude that Kentucky's statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments
in public school rooms has no secular legislative purpose, and is therefore unconstitutional." 449
U.S. at 40-41. This conjunctive approach to the Lemon framework has been restated in Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 582-83 (1987), and Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
41. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
42. The three-part Lemon test "is the only coherent test a majority of the Court has ever
adopted." Wallace v. Jairee, 472 U.S. 38, 63 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
43. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
44. Id. at 60. Twenty-one states have legislative schemes which either permit or require public
school students to observe a moment of silence. Johnson, supra note 5, at 1019. For a discussion of
the constitutional problems inherent in moment-of-silence statutes see Note, The Unconstitutionality
of State Statutes Authorizing Moments of Silence in the Public Schools, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1874
(1983).
45. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 40. For a thorough analysis of the Court's rationale, see David
Lubecky, Note, Silent Moments in Public Schools: Wallace v. Jaffree, 54 U. CIN. L. Rav. 1405
(1986).
46. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 60. The statute in question was an amendment to an earlier statute
authorizing a moment of silence "for meditation" only. Id. at 40. The Bill's sponsor stated that the
amendment was "an effort to return voluntary prayer" to the public schools. Id. at 43.
47. See supra note 17.
48. Justice O'Connor first enunciated the endorsement test in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring), stating that the Court should examine a statute or practice for
Washington University Open Scholarship
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adopt this new endorsement test,49 the Justices declined the opportunity
to do so in Lee v. Weisman when they expressly refused to reconsider the
validity of the original Lemon analysis.5 0 It is thus important at this
juncture to examine the Lemon decision itself.
B. The Lemon Test
Lemon v. Kurtzman" involved two state legislative schemes that pro-
vided state aid to private schools. Together the statutes made state aid
available for secular subjects in private Catholic schools, but forbade
such aid for religious subjects.5 2 The Lemon Court identified a three-
pronged test for determining whether a religious practice is consistent
with the Establishment Clause. 3 To satisfy this tripartite framework,
the practice must: (1) have a secular purpose; (2) neither advance nor
inhibit religion; and (3) not result in excessive entanglement of govern-
ment and religion. 4 Pursuant to the third prong of the test,55 the Lemon
whether it has "the effect of communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of
religion." 465 U.S. at 692.
See generally, Christopher C. Nesbit, Note, County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Justice O'Connor'r
Endorsement Test, 68 N.C.L. REv. 590 (1990), and Comment, Lemon Reconstituted: Justice
O'Connor's Proposed Modification of the Lemon Test for Establishment Clause Violations, 1986
B.Y.U.L. REv. 465.
49. After first announcing the endorsement test in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 687-89
(O'Connor, J., concurring), Justice O'Connor restated the test in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69-
70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring), and a plurality of the Court adopted the endorsement test in
County of Allegheny v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 598-613 (1989) (plurality opinion).
The Allegheny Court, enunciating the primary issue as whether the endorsement test was satisfied,
asked whether the display of a creche and menorah in the particular physical setting in the instant
case had the effect of endorsing or disapproving of religious beliefs. 492 U.S. at 597.
50. See supra note 19. It is therefore consistent that in County of Allegheny v. Greater Pitts-
burgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), Justice Kennedy attacked Justice O'Connor's endorsement test
as fundamentally flawed and unworkable in practice. 492 U.S. at 669 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
51. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
52. Id. at 606-607. The Rhode Island scheme provided fifteen percent salary supplements to
teachers of secular subjects in private schools where the per-pupil expenditure was lower than that of
the public schools. Id. at 607-609. In the second program, Pennsylvania authorized the reimburse-
ment of nonpublic schools for a fraction of teacher salaries and instructional materials in secular
subjects. Id. at 609-11. Under both state systems, Catholic schools were the main beneficiaries of
the programs.
53. 403 U.S. at 612-13.
54. Id. The Lemon Court provided that in order not to violate the Religion Clauses in the
Constitution, any state statute must pass all three tests. "First the statute must have a secular legis-
lative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion ... finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with reli-
gion.'" Id.
55. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, found the first prong of the Lemon test satisfied
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss3/14
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Court held the statutes at issue unconstitutional because they fostered
excessive entanglement between state government and religion.56 As dis-
cussed earlier, the three basic elements comprising the Lemon standard
were not newly devised in Lemon, but developed gradually from the
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause decisions.57
As evinced by the cases giving rise to the Lemon test, history and tra-
dition have played, and continue to play, an integral role in Religion
Clause analysis." The Court in Lemon acted consistently with this
premise by relying on the historical tradition of the practice at issue. In
Lemon, the Court was disturbed by the innovative nature of the statutes
in question and the lack of a historical tradition of the practice the stat-
utes sought to establish.59 The absence of a historical sanction of the
challenged practice buttressed the result dictated by the Lemon formula.
While the Lemon test contained no requirement of history or tradition
in support of the challenged practice, the Court had always looked to
historical evidence when deciding Establishment Clause cases. However,
the role of the history and tradition of a challenged religious practice rose
to new and unexpected heights in Marsh v. Chambers.' The Marsh
because he accepted the legislature's claim that it intended to promote a secular purpose of nonreli-
gious education. Id. at 613. The Court did not reach a precise ruling with respect to whether the
program had the primary effect of advancing religion. 403 U.S. at 613-14.
56. Id. at 607. The majority held that in assessing the degree of entanglement, three factors
were to be considered: (1) the character and purpose of the institution being benefitted; (2) the
nature of the aid; and (3) the resulting relationship between government and religious authorities.
Id. at 615.
The complexity of the excessive entanglement prong of the Lemon test has generated a great deal
of judiciai and scholarly criticism. For the view that this prong leads to inconsistency in Establish-
ment Clause cases and thus should be reformulated see David E. Steinberg, Alternatives to Entangle-
ment, 80 Ky. L.J. 691 (1991-92).
57. Indeed, the Supreme Court expressly recognized that Lemon was the culmination of past
Establishment Clause concepts: "[Lemon reflects] the cumulative criteria developed over many
years and applying to a wide range of governmental action challenged as violative of the Establish-
ment Clause." Committee for Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 n.31 (1973), (quoting
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677-78 (1971)). See also Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 358
(1975) ("These tests constitute a convenient, accurate distillation of this Court's efforts over the past
decades .... ).
58. The Supreme Court has refused to "construe the Religion Clauses with a literalness that
would undermine the ultimate constitutional objective as illuminated by history." Walz v. Tax Com-
mission, 397 U.S. 664, 671 (1970) (citing Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)). The Court's
"interpretation of the Establishment Clause has [consistently] comported with what history reveals
was the contemporaneous understanding of its guarantees." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673
(1984).
59. Lemon, 403 U.S. 602, 624-25 (1971).
60. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
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Court flatly ignored the Lemon test in deciding an Establishment Clause
case, and relied solely upon historical evidence to sustain the religious
activity in issue.
C. The Marsh Decision
In Marsh, the Supreme Court held that a statute which provides for a
state-employed, legislative chaplain to give an invocation at the begin-
ning of each legislative session was constitutional.61 In so holding, the
Court did not pretend to apply the three-pronged Lemon analysis.62 In-
stead, the Justices sustained the practice by applying a test that relied
solely on the history and tradition of the legislative prayers at issue.63
The Marsh Court's "history and tradition" test weighed the constitu-
tional concerns surrounding the challenged practice against the historical
background and tradition of implementing the practice to determine
whether history and tradition could validate the practice.' The Court
concluded that because the Framers of the Constitution had paid legisla-
tive chaplains to open their daily sessions with a prayer, this practice
must not be violative of the First Amendment Establishment Clause.65
Since the Lemon decision was rendered in 1971, Marsh marks the only
time in the history of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause juris-
prudence in which the Court ignored the Lemon framework.66 The
Marsh Court, departing from the traditional Lemon analysis on the issue
of the constitutionality of government sponsored ceremonial invocations,
paved the foundation for courts to rely solely on history and tradition as
justification for validating invocations at public school graduation cere-
monies." After Marsh, it became unclear whether the Court was adopt-
ing the position that certain practices so solidly and strongly rooted
61. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792-95.
62. Id. at 796. "The Court makes no pretense of subjecting Nebraska's practice of legislative
prayer to any of the formal 'tests' that have traditionally structured our inquiry under the Establish-
ment Clause." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 786-87. The Court also emphasized that Congress voted in favor of the appointment
of a chaplain only three days before it agreed on the final wording of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 788.
Thus, the implication arises that the Framers of the First Amendment saw no conflict between the
proscriptions of that Amendment and the daily observance of prayer at the very seat of government.
64. 463 U.S. at 792-93.
65. The Court reasoned that the Nebraska state legislative prayer at issue must be permissible
under the Establishment Clause if analogous prayers were deemed constitutional by the Framers on
the federal level. Id. at 790-91.
66. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2663 n.4 (1992) (Blackmun, ., concurring).
67. See, eg., Stein v. Plainwell Comm. Sch., 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987).
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throughout history should be exempt from the three-pronged Lemon test
and be sustained on the basis of tradition alone.6"
Thus, a conflict soon emerged among the lower courts as some courts
chose to apply the three-pronged Lemon test to the issue of whether in-
vocations and benedictions were permissible at public school ceremonies,
while others adopted the Marsh test, attempting to sustain graduation
prayers through the use of historical evidence alone.69 Because the lower
courts were articulating conflicting views concerning the proper analyti-
cal framework that should govern the constitutionality of ceremonial
prayer in the public schools, a significant need arose for the Supreme
Court to settle the bitter dispute. Unfortunately, Weisman proved ellip-
tical on this critical point.
III. LEE V. WEISMAN
Lee v. Weisman 1o found its genesis on June 20, 1989, when Rabbi Les-
lie Gutterman delivered the invocation"1 and benediction7" at the gradua-
68. TRIBE, supra note 13, § 14-2, 115-57 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the role of history and
tradition).
69. The debate over whether the Marsh test or the Lemon test applies in the public school
graduation ceremony setting, as well as whether reference to a deity in graduation prayer is disposi-
tive of the prayer's constitutionality, has generated a plethora of decisions at the state appellate court
and federal district court level. Brief for Utah, Idaho, North Dakota, Pennsylvania and Wyoming in
support of Petitioner at *5-6, Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (No. 90-1014) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, S. Ct. file). Prayer at graduation was upheld in Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F.Supp. 285
(E.D.Va. 1974); Wood v. Mt. Lebanon Township Sch. Dist., 342 F.Supp. 1293 (W.D.Pa. 1972);
Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 225 Cal.App.3d 1385 (1989); and Wiest v. Mt. Lebanon Town-
ship Sch. Dist., 320 A.2d 362 (Pa. 1974). Analogous graduation prayers were invalidated in Lund-
berg v. West Monona Comm. Sch. Dist., 731 F.Supp. 331 (N.D.Iowa 1989); Kay v. David Douglas
Sch. Dist. No. 40, 719 P.2d 875 (Or. 1986).
See also, Jager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824 (1Ith Cir. 1989) (applying Lemon to
invocations before high school football games); Stein v. Plainwell Comm. Sch., 822 F.2d 1406 (6th
Cir. 1987) (applying Marsh to high school graduation invocations and benedictions to hold that they
serve a constitutionally secular purpose); Collins v. Chandler Unified Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 759 (9th
Cir. 1981) (applying Lemon to strike down opening prayers recited by a student at voluntary school
pep rallies); Berlin v. Okaloosa County Sch. Dist., (N.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 1988) (1988 WL 85937) (ap-
plying Marsh to invocations before high school football games); Graham v. Central Comm. Sch.
Dist., 608 F. Supp. 531 (S.D.Iowa 1985) (applying Lemon to high school graduation invocations to
hold that they promote a Christian religious purpose); Bennet v. Livermore Unified Sch. Dist., 193
Cal. App. 3d 1012, 238 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1987) (applying Marsh to high school graduation
invocations).
70. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
71. For his invocation, Rabbi Gutterman prayed as follows:
God of the Free, Hope of the Brave: For the legacy of America where diversity is cele-
brated and the rights of minorities are protected, we thank You. May these young men
and women grow up to enrich it. For the liberty of America, we thank You. May these
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tion ceremony at Nathan Bishop Middle School, a public school in
Providence, Rhode Island.73 Daniel Weisman, whose daughter Deborah
was among the graduates, ified a lawsuit in federal district court.74 Weis-
man contended that the inclusion of the prayers violated the First
Amendment.75
The district court ruled in favor of Weisman holding that the gradua-
tion prayers unconstitutionally advanced religion because they created a
close nexus between the school and a deity in violation of the Lemon
test.76  In so ruling, the District Court of Rhode Island expressly de-
clined to follow Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools." In Stein, the
new graduates grow up to guard it. For the political process of America in which all its
citizens may participate, for its court system where all may seek justice we thank You.
May those we honor this morning always turn to it in trust. For the destiny of America we
thank You. May the graduates of Nathan Bishop Middle School so live that they might
help to share it. May our aspirations for our country and for these young people, who are
our hope for the future, be richly fulfilled. Amen.
112 S. Ct. at 2652.
72. For his benediction, Rabbi Gutterman offered the following prayer:
o God, we are grateful to You for having endowed us with the capacity for learning which
we have celebrated on this joyous commencement. Happy families give thanks for seeing
their children achieve an important milestone. Send Your blessings upon the teachers and
administrators who helped prepare them. The graduates now need strength and guidance
for the future, help them to understand that we are not complete with academic knowledge
alone. We must each strive to fulfill what You require of us all: To do justly, to love
mercy, to walk humbly. We give thanks to You, Lord, for keeping us alive, sustaining us
and allowing us to reach this special, happy occasion. Amen.
112 S. Ct. at 2653.
73. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2652.
74. Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68 (D.R.I. 1990).
75. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2654. Four days before the ceremony, Daniel Weisman sought a
temporary restraining order to prevent the inclusion of an invocation and benediction in the public
junior high school graduation ceremony. Id. at 2653-54. The district court denied the motion the
day before the ceremony, due to a lack of time to consider the motion adequately before the sched-
uled event. Id. at 2654.
After attending the graduation ceremony where the prayers were delivered, Daniel Weisman filed
an amended complaint seeking a permanent injunction barring the clergy from delivering invoca-
tions and benedictions at future public school graduations in Providence, Rhode Island. Id.
76. 728 F. Supp at 68-71. The district court determined that the Rabbi's invocation and bene-
diction failed under the second prong of the Lemon test. Id. at 71-73. See supra notes 51-59 and
accompanying text for an in-depth discussion of the Lemon test. The second prong of the test
addresses whether the challenged practice has as its principal or primary effect the advancement or
inhibition of religion. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
The district court did not reach the inquiries raised by the first and third prongs of the Lemon
test-whether the practice had a secular purpose and whether it fostered an excessive entanglement
with religion. Weisman, 728 F. Supp. at 71-75. Violation of any one of the three prongs of the
Lemon analysis renders the challenged practice unconstitutional. See supra note 54 and accompany-
ing text.
77. Stein v. Plainwell Comm. Sch., 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987).
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Sixth Circuit ruled that nondenominational invocations and benedictions
at public school graduation ceremonies are not per se unconstitutional.7"
The Stein court relied upon the Marsh history and tradition test79 and
determined that nondenominational prayers mentioning God were
deeply rooted in the history of public school graduation ceremonies.80
The district court in Weisman conversely concluded that the Marsh deci-
sion had only limited application to the unique situation of legislative
prayer."1 The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
decision in a majority opinion that simply adopted the lower court's
reasoning.
2
A bare majority of the members of the Supreme Court agreed with the
courts below that members of the clergy could not deliver prayers at
public school graduation ceremonies without running afoul of the Estab-
lishment Clause. 3 Although five Justices believed the challenged invoca-
tion and benediction unconstitutional, 4 they were not unanimous in
their reasoning. Coercion was the focal point of the majority's opinion.
78. Stein, 822 F.2d at 1409-10. The Stein majority examined the language of the prayer at issue
and concluded that it violated the Establishment Clause under the Marsh test. Id. at 1410. In sharp
contrast to the secular invocation involved in Marsh, the prayer in Stein impermissibly favored the
Christian religion because it "expressly invoke[d] the name of Jesus as the Savior" and "'symboli-
cally place[d] the government's seal of approval on one religious view.'" 822 F.2d at 1410. Thus,
the Stein opinion left open the possibility that a secularly worded prayer at graduation would pass
constitutional muster under the Marsh analysis.
79. For a discussion of Marsh, see supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text. The Stein Court
concluded that the invocations and benedictions at issue were governed by the Marsh standard be-
cause graduation ceremonies were analogous to the legislative and judicial sessions at issue in Marsh.
Stein, 822 F.2d at 1409.
80. Id. Stein involved graduation exercises at the Plainwell and Portage Central High Schools
in Western Michigan. Id. at 1407. Invocations and benedictions had been a historical part of the
Plainwell High School commencements since 1980, 822 F.2d at 1411 (Wellford, J., dissenting), and a
traditional part of the Portage Central High School commencements since 1970. Id. at 1407.
The Stein Court relied on Marsh to conclude that secularized prayer at graduation ceremonies has
the legitimate secular purpose of providing solemnity and dignity to the occasion. d. at 1409.
81. Weisman, 728 F. Supp. at 73-74. The district court also implicitly noted that Rabbi Gut-
terman's invocation and benediction might have withstood an Establishment Clause challenge if they
had not referred to a deity. Id.
82. Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990). Judge Bownes' concurring opinion traveled
one step farther than that of the majority, finding that the graduation prayer violated all three prongs
of the Lemon analysis. d. at 1094-95. Judge Bownes elaborated on the purpose and entanglement
prongs of the Lemon test, which the district court did not address. Id. Judge Bownes also stated in
dictum that even a prayer not mentioning a Deity violates the Establishment Clause. 908 F.2d at
1097.
83. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
84. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens,
O'Connor and Souter.
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Four concurring justices believed that, although the students were co-
erced into attending their graduation ceremony, coercion was not a nec-
essary element in an Establishment Clause violation. 5
Justice Kennedy, authoring the majority opinion, ignored the long-
standing history and tradition of graduation prayers. Focusing on the
special context of public schools, Kennedy held that the historical analy-
sis adopted in Marsh upholding daily prayer at legislative sessions 6 did
not apply to prayer at public school graduations.8 7 Justice Kennedy
opined that the earlier teachings of Engel8 8 and Schempp8 9 commanded
that the Court be particularly vigilant when monitoring public school
officials' compliance with the Establishment Clause.90 Justice Kennedy
emphasized that the individuals affected by the challenged prayer in
Marsh were mature adults in a legislative session who, presumably, were
not readily susceptible to religious indoctrination and capable of in-
dependent thought.91 In sharp contrast, Justice Kennedy reasoned that
the affected persons in Weisman were impressionable young students.
A. The Role of State Sponsorship
Justice Kennedy argued that the challenged prayers superseded the
limitations that the Establishment Clause imposed upon government. 92
Cognizant of Engel's mandate that government refrain from engaging in
the business of writing or sanctioning official prayers in the classroom, 93
it logically followed that consistency under the Lemon framework re-
quired. prohibition of the school's graduation prayer. Without expressly
relying upon Lemon,94 it is clear that Justice Kennedy was suggesting
85. See infra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
87. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2660-61. In his dissent, Scalia argued that history and tradition
play a crucial role in determining the constitutionality of graduation prayers. Id. at 2678-86. See
infra subpart III(C).
88. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
89. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
90. 112 S. Ct. at 2658. "As we have observed before, there are heightened concerns with pro-
tecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary public
schools." Id.
91. Id. at 2660-61. Justice Kennedy also noted that it was normal for adults in the legislature
to come and go with ease. Id. These dynamics were quite different from those of a junior high
school graduation ceremony. Id.
92. Id. at 2655.
93. 370 U.S. 421, 433-36 (1962).
94. Justice Scalia stated that the majority opinion "demonstrates the irrelevance of Lemon by
essentially ignoring it." Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2685 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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that the invocation and benediction violated the "excessive entangle-
ment" prong of the Lemon analysis, by "creating a state-sponsored and
state-directed religious exercise in a public school."95
Justice Kennedy emphasized that the school principal's selection of
Rabbi Gutterman as the graduation speaker constituted a choice that
was directly attributable to the state of Rhode Island.96 Moreover, evi-
dence of state sponsorship of the prayer was heightened when the princi-
pal provided Rabbi Gutterman with a copy of "Guidelines for Civic
Occasions" and counseled the Rabbi that the prayers should reflect only
nonsectarian beliefs.97 Although the principal's command to the Rabbi
that he compose a neutral prayer reflected a good faith effort to ensure
nonsectarianism, Justice Kennedy opined that such subjective intent was
irrelevant to the question of the legitimacy of having prayer at gradua-
tion ceremonies. 98
B. The Role of Coercion
The majority next turned its attention toward the coercion element.
Justice Kennedy believed that something less than the traditional, direct,
95. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2655 (1992).
96. Id. Justice Kennedy opined that the principal's choice of speaker transformed the chal-
lenged practice into a state statute decreeing that prayers be recited at graduation. Id. Justice Ken-
nedy found it necessary to make this connection because the Lemon test was specifically created to
deal with the constitutionality of state statutes. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
However, the Court had extended Lemon to governmental policies and practices as well as legisla-
tive schemes. See County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989)
(plurality opinion) (applying Lemon to governmental practices); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,
271 (1981) (applying Lemon to governmental policies). Thus, Justice Kennedy had to either analo-
gize the challenged invocation and benediction to a practice or policy, or in the alternative, liken the
action to a state statute in order to apply the Lemon test.
97. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2656 (1992). Justice Kennedy commented that because
the principal provided the Rabbi with guidelines:
[t]hrough these means the principal directed and controlled the content of the prayer.
Even if the only sanction for ignoring the instructions were that the rabbi would not be
invited back, we think no religious representative who valued his or her continued reputa-
tion and effectiveness in the community would incur the State's displeasure in this regard.
Id.
98. Id. Justice Kennedy acknowledged that principal Robert Lee had engaged in a genuine
attempt to guarantee that the sectarianism of prayer "which is so often the flashpoint for religious
animosity be removed from the graduation ceremony." d. Nonetheless, the school had offended
the Constitution because government may not "establish an official or civic religion as a means of
avoiding the establishment of a religion with more specific creeds." Id. at 2657. Justice Souter
expressed a similar view emphasizing the principle that "the Establishment Clause forbids state-
sponsored prayers in public school settings no matter how nondenominational the prayers may be."
Id. at 2667 (Souter, J., concurring).
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legal coercion triggers an Establishment Clause violation.99 His focus
centered upon indirect, psychological coercion.1°° Justice Kennedy's in-
quiry concentrated upon whether the challenged graduation prayers op-
erated to "psychologically coerce" the students of Nathan Bishop Middle
School to participate in a religious exercise.101 Justice Kennedy believed
that the unique characteristics of the school environment 10 2 coupled with
the youth and impressionability of junior high school students10 3 gave
rise to heightened concerns that psychological or socially coercive pres-
sures existed. 104
In examining the potential for coercion, the Weisman Court focused
specifically upon the dynamics of the graduation ceremony itself as a ve-
hicle for religious compulsion." 5 When Rabbi Gutterman stood to de-
liver the invocation, Justice Kennedy feared that a student would be left
with no meaningful choice but to rise from his or her seat and stand
respectfully in silence in conformity with teachers and fellow students.0 6
99. 112 S. Ct. at 2658-60. See infra notes 122-27 and accompanying text for Justice Scalia's
views on the role of direct, legal coercion.
100. Id. at 2658. See infra notes 101-12 and accompanying text.
101. 112 S. Ct. at 2658. Cf Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). For a discussion ofEngel, see
supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text. "The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise
Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the
enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce
nonobserving individuals or not." Engel, 370 U.S. at 430.
102. See generally, Malcolm Stewart, The First Amendment, The Public Schools, and the Incul-
cation of Community Values, 18 J. L. & EDUC. 23 (1989). The school house atmosphere has been
deemed inherently special because of its inculcative function, highly sensitive and impressionable
youthful composition, physically confining setting, and the demands of the educational mission.
Bethel v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (justifying restrictions on student speech that would not be
justifiable for adults in non-school settings).
103. The Court has consistently recognized that the inherent immaturity and inexperience of
young, school-age children will often justify their special protection. See FCC v. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726 (1978) (holding that George Carlin's vulgar monologue, which had been aired on
public radio, was without First Amendment free speech protection because of the broadcasting's
unique accessibility to children). "[Tjhe government's interest in the 'well-being of its youth'
justified the regulation of otherwise protected expression." Id. at 749.
104. "Our decisions... recognize, among other things, that prayer exercises in public schools
carry a particular risk of indirect coercion. The concern may not be limited to the context of
schools, but it is most pronounced there." Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2658.
105. Id. at 2658-61.
106. Id. Kennedy noted that in the American culture, standing and remaining silent for a
speech or prayer can signify different feelings; adherence to the views espoused or mere respect for
the views of others. Id.
But for the dissenter of high school age, who has a reasonable perception that she is being
forced by the State to pray in a manner her conscience will not allow, the injury is no less
real. There can be no doubt that for many, if not most, of the students at the graduation,
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In this fashion, students attending the graduation ceremony were forced
to succumb to public pressure as well as peer pressure which, however
"subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion."" °7
Although mature adults might be able to avoid yielding to such pressures
of conformity, Justice Kennedy refused to require the same of primary
and secondary school children.10"
Justice Kennedy, rebuking the claims of the principal and school that
graduation was not a mandatory event,"°C determined that potential psy-
chological coercion became real psychological coercion because the in-
herent importance of a graduation ceremony compels students to attend,
transforming graduation into an involuntary activity.110 Commencement
is an impressive and memorable occasion in virtually every school in the
Nation. It represents the achievement of a goal that students, their par-
ents, friends and teachers have worked long and hard to attain.11 Jus-
the act of standing or remaining silent was an expression of participation in the Rabbi's
prayer.
Id.
107. Id. at 2658. Justice Kennedy believed that a student could not choose to remain seated,
because of the obvious peer pressures placed on the student. Id.
108. 112 S. Ct. at 2659. The Court has continued to recognize that young school-aged children
are more susceptible than adults to religious messages. "We have particularly relied on Lemon in
every case involving the sensitive relationship between government and religion in the education of
our children... [because] the government's activities in this area can have a magnified impact on
impressionable young minds .... Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 383 (1985). See
also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583-84 (1987) ("The Court has been particularly vigilant in
monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary schools ....
The State exerts great authority and coercive power through mandatory attendance requirements,
and because of the students' emulation of teachers as role models and the children's susceptibility to
peer pressure.").
109. The principal and school argued that, because students were free to choose whether or not
to attend the graduation ceremony, there was no coercion to participate in the religious prayers
recited at the ceremony. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2659. Unlike the classroom prayer situation in
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), where school attendance was mandatory thus forcing students
to be present for morning prayer or suffer embarrassment when choosing not to participate in the
morning prayer, students at Nathan Bishop Middle School had the luxury of staying away from the
graduation ceremony altogether. Brief for the Petitioner at *31, Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649
(1992) (No. 90-1014) (LEXIS, Genfed library, S. Ct. file).
110. Id. at 2659.
Everyone knows that in our society and in our culture high school graduation is one of
life's most significant occasions. A school rule which excuses attendance is beside the
point. Attendance may not be required by official decree, yet it is apparent that a student is
not free to absent herself from the graduation exercise in any real sense of the term
'voluntary'.
Id.
I 11. Id. "Graduation is a time for family and those closest to the student to celebrate success
and express mutual wishes of gratitude and respect, all to the end of impressing upon the young
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tice Kennedy believed that graduation could not reasonably be deemed
"voluntary" in any real sense of the word because students' absence from
graduation would require forfeiture of those intangible benefits which
motivate students throughout their youth and all their high school
years.' 2
Justice Kennedy's focus on the indirect coercive effects of the gradua-
tion prayer on the school's students" 3 prompted Justice Blackmun to
write a separate concurring opinion. In his concurrence, Justice Black-
mun expressed the view that government coercion of religious conform-
ity was not a necessary element of an Establishment Clause violation." 4
Justice Blackmun traced the Court's Establishment Clause decisions to
demonstrate that historically, Establishment Clause violations consist-
ently were found absent any government compulsion of religious partici-
pation." 5 Justice Blackmun, concluding that the school had actively
promoted the Rabbi's commencement prayer, would have rested the
Court's finding of a constitutional violation on the government's endorse-
ment of a religious practice." 6 While agreeing with Justice Kennedy
that the school had indirectly coerced the students into participating in a
religious exercise, Blackmun viewed the value of coercion as an indicia of
the government's endorsement of religion."7
Justice Souter also parted company with the majority on the issue of
coercion as a necessary component of an Establishment Clause viola-
tion.18 Justice Souter believed that Justice Kennedy's psychology-of-co-
person the role that it is his or her right and duty to assume in the community and all of its diverse
parts." Id.
112. Id. The principal and school recognized that graduates had a strong desire to attend their
graduation ceremony, but contended that such a desire could not be said to rise to the level of
government compulsion to attend the commencement exercise. Brief for the Petitioner at *31, Lee v.
Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (No. 90-1014) (LEXIS, Genfed library, S. Ct. file).
113. See supra notes 99-112 and accompanying text.
114. Justice Blackmun was joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor.
For the view that the Framers of the First Amendment intended only to protect against govern-
ment coercion of religious conformity see M. McConnell, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the
Constitution: Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 933 (1986).
115. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2664-67 (1992) ("The Court repeatedly has recognized that a viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause is not predicated on coercion."). This premise was articulated in
Comm. for Public Ed. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 786 (1973), where the Court stated that "proof of
coercion is not a necessary element of any claim under the Establishment Clause." Id.
116. 112 S. Ct. at 2664.
117. Id. Justice Blackmun noted that "[g]overnment pressure to participate in a religious activ-
ity is an obvious indication that the government is endorsing or promoting religion." Id.
118. Justice Souter's concurring opinion was joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor.
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ercion test blurred the line the Court had consistently drawn between
asserted Free Exercise Clause violations, in which coercion is a factor
appropriately considered, and Establishment Clause violations, which
reach beyond a prohibition of government coercion. 119 Justice Souter
held that to require government coercion, even Justice Kennedy's indi-
rect, psychological coercion, of religious participation in an Establish-
ment Clause violation, would make the Free Exercise Clause a
redundancy. 120  Moreover, an analysis based upon coercion would un-
dermine Establishment Clause values recognized in longstanding
precedent. 121
The majority's view of what constituted "coercion" encompassed a
wider array of governmental actions than did the dissent's. In his dis-
sent, Justice Scalia was deeply troubled by the Court's decision to "in-
vent[ ] a boundless, and boundlessly manipulable test of psychological
coercion." '22 Scalia defined "coercion" in its traditional sense as a legal
compulsion carrying the "threat of penalty" or "force of law". 2 ' He did
not agree that social or psychological coercion triggered an Establish-
ment Clause violation. Applying a legal definition of coercion, Scalia
concluded that the majority's result in Weisman did not follow. Justice
Scalia reasoned that the students were not legally compelled to attend
graduation or participate in the Rabbi's prayers, nor would they suffer a
119. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2667. "The distinction between the two [Religion] Clauses is appar-
ent-a violation of the Free Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment
Clause violation need not be so attended." Id. at 2673 (quoting School Dist. of Abington v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963)).
120. 112 S. Ct. at 2672-73. Justice Souter rejected the newly formulated coercion test as running
afoul of both precedent and the text and structure of the Establishment Clause itself. Id. at 2671-76.
See also Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27
WM. & MARY L. REV. 875 (1986). Professor Laycock asserted that because the Framers wrote two
Religion Clauses into the First Amendment, it is unlikely that the two clauses would have the ex-
actly the same meaning. Id. at 922-23. "If coercion is also an element of the Establishment Clause,
establishment adds nothing to free exercise." Id. at 922.
121. The Court stated in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962), that "[t]he Establishment
Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental
compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether
those laws operate directly to coerce the nonobserving individuals or not." Recently, the Court
reiterated that "this Court has never relied on coercion alone as the touchstone of Establishment
Clause analysis." County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 628 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Souter expressed the appropriate legal analysis to be one devoid
of coercion where "the state may not favor or endorse either religion generally over nonreligion or
one religion over others." Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2676 (Souter, J., concurring).
122. 112 S. Ct. at 2679 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 2683.
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penalty if they chose to abstain. 12 4
The dissent reprimanded the majority for parading as psychologists
and cautioned the Justices against basing their decision on a "few cita-
tions of 'research in psychology'" that showed the susceptibility of ado-
lescents to coercion. 125  Even assuming arguendo that psychological
coercion was a necessary element in an Establishment Clause violation,
Justice Scalia concluded that those students attending the graduation
ceremony were not psychologically "coerced" in the real sense of the
word "coercion."' 126  Scalia found the Court's "psycho-coercism"
unpersuasive. 127
C. The Role of History and Tradition
For Justice Scalia, the role of history and tradition, not the presence or
absence of coercion (legal or psychological), was the dispositive factor.
Yet, Lee v. Weisman was totally devoid of any mention of history and
tradition. In his acerbic dissent, 128 Justice Scalia embraced the Marsh
test of looking to the historical tradition supporting the challenged prac-
tice.' 29 The dissent sharply criticized the majority's failure to consider
adequately the history and tradition of invocations and benedictions in
American public ceremonies.' 30 Scalia observed that "a page of history
is worth a volume of-logic,"'' and yet the Court's opinion was "conspic-
uously bereft of any reference to history."'13 2
Scalia opined that public prayers at civil ceremonies have been a fix-
ture of America's life and heritage since the Nation's inception and were
not the type of activity that the Framers intended the Establishment
124. Id. at 2684. Justice Scalia contrasted Weisman with West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Bar-
nette, 319 U.S. 624, 629-30 (1943) (regarding a law that mandated that schoolchildren recite the
Pledge of Allegiance or else face expulsion).
125. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2681 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 2684.
127. Id. at 2683.
128. Justice Scalia referred to Justice Kennedy's majority opinion as a "lamentable decision"
and a "jurisprudential disaster." Id. at 2685. Justice Scalia opined that "depriv[ing] our society of
that important unifying mechanism [nondenominational prayer] ... is as senseless in policy as it is
unsupported in law." Id. at 2686.
129. Id. at 2678-81. Justice Scalia was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices White and
Thomas.
130. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2678-79.
131. 112 S. Ct. at 2679 (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)).
132. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2678.
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Clause to forbid. 133 To the contrary, the Founders uniformly welcomed
and encouraged public ceremonial prayers and appeals for guidance to
the "Almighty." 134 Justice Scalia was particularly impressed by the no-
tion that virtually every president has adhered to the tradition of giving
"Thanksgiving Proclamations" praying gratitude to God.135
Justice Scalia observed that it is significant that the Weisman opinion
ignores history and tradition. x36 The Court refused to consider the long-
133. Id. at 2678-79. "[T]he Court-with nary a mention that it is doing so-lays waste a tradi-
tion that is as old as public school graduation ceremonies themselves, and that is a component of an
even more longstanding American tradition of nonsectarian prayer to God at public celebrations
generally." Id. at 2679.
134. Id. at 2679. Justice Scalia pointed to the Declaration of Independence as an example of an
official ceremonial expression of a religious belief by the Founders which "appeal[ed] to the Supreme
Judge of the world, [God]" and relied upon "the protection of divine Providence." 112 S. Ct. at
2679. The dissent also noted that George Washington began the longstanding tradition of opening
presidential inaugural ceremonies with prayer in his first inaugural address, seeking the blessings of
God, "that Almighty Being." Id. Justice Scalia also noted that Thomas Jefferson prayed in his first
inaugural address to the "Infinite Power which rules the destinies of the universe .... Id. at 2680.
More recently, former President Bush included in his first inaugural address statements of religious
sentiment and appeals for God's assistance. Id.
Presidents are also constitutionally required to take the Presidential oath upon the Bible. Article
II of the Constitution provides:
Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, [the President] shall take the following Oath
or Affirmation: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of
President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and
defend the Constitution of the United States."
U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 8. The clause represents a sacred vow. Brief for United States at *11,
Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (No. 90-1014) (LEXIS, Genfed library S. Ct. file). So too
are jurors and witnesses participating and serving in the court system required to swear upon the
Bible and take oaths under "those solemn obligations which appeal to the God of Truth impose."
Id.
135. Id. at 2680. Justice Scalia observed that ceremonial references to God had been adopted by
the legislative and judicial branches of government as well. Id. As early as 1774, the first Continen-
tal Congress opened with a prayer. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673-74 (1984). After the
framing of the Constitution, and "[i]n the very week that Congress approved the Establishment
Clause as part of the Bill of Rights for submission to the states, it enacted legislation providing for
paid Chaplains for the House and the Senate." 465 U.S. at 674.
The federal judiciary has encouraged religious proclamations within its tribunals. The Supreme
Court's own sessions have been opened with the invocation "God save the United States and this
Honorable Court" since as early as the court of Chief Justice Marshall. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2680
(citing WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 469 (1922)). Prayer as an
opening to circuit court became a routine occurrence. Brief for United States at * 11, Lee v. Weis-
man, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (No. 90-1014) (LEXIS, Genfed library S. Ct. file).
It has been considered significant that Thomas Jefferson, regarded as one of the strictest advocates
for separation of church and state, expressed a divine blessing during his second inaugural address.
Brief for United States at *9, Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (No. 90-1014) (LEXIS, Genfed
library S. Ct. file).
136. See supra notes 128-135. Only Justice Souter's concurring opinion addresses the history
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standing history and tradition of allowing invocations and benedictions
at public high school graduation ceremonies 37 or to consider other tradi-
tional acknowledgments of religion at public ceremonies.1 38  Scalia
clearly found that the requisite historical sources were present to support
the challenged practice in Weisman.
IV. IMPACT OF LEE V WEISMAN
On a fundamental level, Lee v. Weisman presented the opportunity for
the Court to end the confusion existing in the very volatile and divisive
area of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. However, instead of provid-
ing clarity, the Court further clouded the difficult First Amendment is-
sues raised by prayer at public high school ceremonies. It is quite
apparent from Weisman that a majority of the Court have signaled a
retreat from the longstanding history and tradition formula when dealing
with the public school context. It may be that the presence of govern-
mental coercion overrides any showing that the practice is strongly
rooted in history and tradition.
Moreover, the Court's decision to ignore the Lemon test is particularly
significant in light of the Court's failure to address the impressive histori-
and tradition of religious prayers at public ceremonies. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2668-70 (Souter, J.,
concurring). Even after meticulously perusing the Framers' intent and the history of their religious
activity, Justice Souter concluded that "since there is no conclusive evidence to the contrary, ... on
balance, history neither contradicts nor warrants reconsideration of the settled principle that the
Establishment Clause forbids support for" preferential as well as nonpreferential religion. Weisman,
112 S. Ct. at 2670 (Souter, J., concurring). See Jeffrey Rosen, The New Republic, January 18, 1993,
at 20.
Rosen, The New Republic, supra, also notes the inconsistent position Scalia takes in his adherence
to history and tradition in Weisman. There is an inherent tension between such a use of extrinsic
evidence to buttress his claim that religious prayer at civic ceremonies is rooted in the Framers' past
when one examines Justice Scalia's reluctance to consult extrinsic evidence of Congress' intent when
engaging in statutory interpretation. Scalia is well known for his position that extrinsic evidence is
unreliable for shedding any light on Congress' legislative intent. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergerson,
498 U.S. 87 (1989). It seems that Justice Scalia arbitrarily invokes extrinsic evidence of the Framers'
intentions with respect to interpreting the Constitution when it suits his purpose.
137. Public education had its origin in religious schools. It is thus not surprising that it is from
churches that schools have inherited the traditional graduation ceremony itself. In 1642, the first
graduation took place at the well-known Ivy League School, Harvard University. That graduation
included a prayer given by the President of the University. When commencement exercises made
their way into the high school setting in the 1800s, the high schools mirrored their graduation cere-
monies after the colleges and universities, which included a religious prayer. Brief of the State of
Delaware in Support of Petitioners, at *10, Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (No. 90-1014)
(LEXIS, Genfed library S. Ct. file) (citing A. FINK, EVALUATION OF COMMENCEMENT PRACTICES
IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SECONDARY SCHOOLs 24 (1940)). See also supra note I.
138. See supra notes 134-135.
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cal and traditional evidence supporting prayer at graduation and civic
ceremonies. Throughout the evolution of church and state jurispru-
dence, the Court has emphasized the history and tradition of the chal-
lenged practice as evidence within the context of the Lemon framework.
Additionally, the use of historical evidence has provided the underlying
structure for the three prongs of the Lemon test. The Court has often
utilized the history and tradition of a challenged practice to show that it
involved no significant danger of raising a religious purpose, effect or an
entanglement of government and religion. Yet in Weisman, the existence
of substantial historical approval of the challenged graduation prayers
was not used to support the result that the Court reached. Thus, it is
possible that the Court strategically chose to abandon its usual reliance
on history and tradition in order to avoid having to reconsider the proper
role of Lemon in Establishment Clause jurisprudence when the Lemon
test yields a result in conflict with a strong showing of history and
tradition.
By ignoring the role of history and tradition in Establishment Clause
analysis, disregarding the Lemon framework and utilizing a new coer-
cion test, the plurality leaves uncertain the applicability of the Lemon
test in all Establishment Clause cases. The Court has expressed, in the
past, an "unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion" in
the sensitive area of church and state.139 Only further litigation will de-
termine whether the existence or absence of governmental coercion is
now the determinative element in Establishment Clause disputes, sup-
planting history and tradition and the Lemon analysis--or whether coer-
cion is only one factor to consider in addition to these other well-settled
principles.
On a more specific level, Lee v. Weisman leaves many questions unan-
swered. In its most narrow terms, Weisman effectively outlaws all
prayer at public school graduation ceremonies. But the ruling does not
go so far as to outlaw all prayer in other public school settings. In Weis-
man, Justice Kennedy took pains to emphasize that the school's act of
selecting the Rabbi to speak at graduation was tantamount to state spon-
sorship and endorsement of prayer."4 Thus, the Court leaves open the
possibility that student selection of a graduation speaker to deliver prayer
is permissible. Similarly, the Court leaves open the question whether stu-
139. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679.
140. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
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dent volunteers, themselves, could deliver a nondenominational prayer at
a graduation ceremony.141 Because of the absence of direct involvement
on the part of school officials, both of these cases would be distinguish-
able from Weisman, and would differ greatly from the active participa-
tion of the school principal in Weisman.142 Therefore, Weisman may not
impose an absolute barrier to student-initiated prayers, unsupervised by
school officials.
Significantly, the particular invocations and benedictions at issue in
Weisman expressly mentioned a deity. 43 Thus, Weisman on its facts
does not proscribe all prayers, regardless of their content. A graduation
prayer that did not include the word "God," might withstand Establish-
ment Clause scrutiny. 1 In addition, the Court's opinion did not address
whether public school ceremonies that carry less importance than a grad-
uation ceremony may contain a school prayer. The Weisman Court
found graduation to play such a significant part of a student's life as to
render it mandatory. 45 The members of the Court would clearly ban
school prayer at a school function for which students feel pressure or
coercion to attend; but perhaps the Court would find school prayer less
offensive in a more innocuous school activity such as a high school foot-
ball game.
As this Recent Development has shown, the Court has a long history
of disallowing any form of organized religion in public schools. Given
this predisposition, it is likely that the current Court would hold any type
of prayer at a public school ceremony to be a constitutional infirmity.
Amy Louise Weinhaus
141. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2661. Justice Kennedy stated that this case dealt only with
"whether a religious exercise may be conducted at a graduation ceremony." Id. Therefore, the
question remains unanswered whether a non-denominational prayer, not delivered by a member of
the clergy, may be constitutionally allowed at public school graduations.
142. Stein v. Plainwell Comm. Sch., 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987), involved both scenarios of
student-organized graduation prayers. The Sixth Circuit found the content of the prayers unconsti-
tutional because they impermissibly favored Christian theology. Id. at 1410.
143. See supra notes 71-72.
144. The district court in Weisman edited the challenged invocation and benediction to provide
a model prayer that would pass constitutional muster. Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68, 74 n.10.
The edited version merely deleted all express and implied references to "God."
145. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
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